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873 F.2d 576
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.

14 Cases that cite this headnote
[2]

NEW ERA PUBLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL,
ApS, A Corporation of Denmark, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY, INC., A
New York Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)1 What Constitutes Infringement
99k54 Books or Other Literary Works
99k56 Fair Use in General

In examining fair use factor concerning nature
of copyrighted work, distinction between use
of protected expression to “enliven” text and
use of protected expression to communicate
“significant points” about subject need not be
made. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2).

Nos. 388, 421, Dockets 88-7707, 88-7795. |
Argued Sept. 30, 1988. | Decided April 19, 1989.
Holders of copyrights on author's works brought action
seeking to enjoin publication of author's biography. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, Pierre N. Leval, J., denied injunctive relief, 695 F.Supp.
1493, and holder appealed. The Court of Appeals, Miner,
Circuit Judge, held that plaintiff was barred by laches from
seeking to enjoin publication of author's biography.

14 Cases that cite this headnote
[3]

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (5)

Fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of
First Amendment in copyright field. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1; 17 U.S.C.A. § 107.

Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Fair Use in General
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)1 What Constitutes Infringement
99k54 Books or Other Literary Works
99k56 Fair Use in General

Distinguishing between use of author's words
to display distinctiveness of his writings and
use of author's words to make point about his
character is unnecessary and unwarranted in
applying statutory fair use factor of purpose of
use; as long as book can be classified as work of
criticism, scholarship or research, factor cuts in
favor of book's publisher. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1).

Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Fair Use and Other Permitted Uses in
General
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)1 What Constitutes Infringement
99k53.2 Fair Use and Other Permitted Uses in
General

Oakes, Chief Judge, filed concurring opinion.

[1]

Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Fair Use in General

13 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Ideas and Concepts in General
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(A) Nature and Subject Matter
99k3 Subjects of Copyright
99k4.5 Ideas and Concepts in General

Author's expression of an idea, as distinguished
from idea itself, is not considered subject
to public's “right to know.” U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
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4 Cases that cite this headnote
[5]

Copyrights and Intellectual Property
Limitations and Laches
99 Copyrights and Intellectual Property
99I Copyrights
99I(J) Infringement
99I(J)2 Remedies
99k72 Actions for Infringement
99k80 Limitations and Laches

Holder of copyrights on author's works was
barred by laches from seeking to enjoin
publication of author's biography, which
allegedly contained infringing material; holder
had been aware for two years that biography
was about to be published in the United States
and had commenced lawsuit in other countries
to enjoin publication, yet failed to inquire of
biography's publisher as to planned date of
publication and failed to take any steps to enjoin
publication until 12,000 copies of the book had
already been printed, packed and shipped.
26 Cases that cite this headnote

of Church of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard *577
and to recover damages for the alleged infringement. The
biography, written by Russell Miller, who is not a party
to the action, is entitled: Bare-Faced Messiah: The True
Story of L. Ron Hubbard (hereafter “the book” or “the
biography”). The plaintiff in the suit, appellant here, is New
Era Publications International, ApS (“New Era”), a Danish
corporation. It holds by license certain copyrights bequeathed
to the Church of Scientology by Hubbard, who died in 1986.
The publisher of the book, Henry Holt and Company, Inc.
(“Holt”), is the defendant in the action and the appellee here.
New Era's claim that the extensive reproduction of Hubbard's
published and unpublished writings in the biography amounts
to infringement of the copyrights it holds is met by Holt's
defense that the use of the Hubbard materials is “fair”
and therefore not infringing within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. The district court concluded that the use of
the unpublished material “cannot be held to pass the fair
use test” and therefore found “that Bare-Faced Messiah
to some degree infringes Hubbard's copyrights in some of
his previously unpublished works.” New Era Publications
International, ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F.Supp. 1493,
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y.1988). For various reasons, however, the
district court declined to issue an injunction, but instead
relegated New Era to the remedy of damages. We affirm,
although we conclude that laches is the sole bar to issuance
of an injunction.

Attorneys and Law Firms
*576 Michael Lee Hertzberg, New York City (Eric
M. Lieberman, Nicholas E. Poser, David B. Goldstein,
Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C.,
New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Robert M. Callagy, New York City (W. Mallory Rintoul,
Mark A. Fowler, Satterlee Stephens Burke & Burke, New
York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Before OAKES, MINER and ALTIMARI, Circuit Judges.
MINER, Circuit Judge:

Preface

I.
Procedural History
This action was preceded by lawsuits commenced in 1987 to
enjoin publication in England and Canada (each of these suits
was dismissed for laches) and in Australia (this suit ultimately
was withdrawn). Despite the fact that an attorney representing
the Church of Scientology had corresponded with Holt in
May of 1986 in an effort to discourage publication of the
book, no action to enjoin publication was commenced in the
United States until the complaint in this action was filed in the
Southern District of New York on May 4, 1988. Immediately
after filing the complaint, New Era applied for a temporary
restraining order.

We re-visit the doctrine of fair use in this action for copyright
infringement brought to enjoin publication of the biography
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Judge Leval, to whom this case was assigned in the district
court, initially denied the temporary restraining order for
laches, noting the following in a written decision dated May
13, 1988:
Never did the plaintiff take sufficient
steps to obtain a copy of the book to
determine whether it differed from the
books published in England, Australia,
and Canada. Never did the plaintiff ask
Holt when it would be published. The
plaintiff did not take any legal step
until May 4 [1988] when it sought the
temporary restraining order. By that
time, as it turned out, the defendant had
published the book, having printed and
packed 12,000 copies, and having sent
out review copies on April 27. With
the exception of 3,000 copies that a
trucker had failed to collect and which
were waiting on the loading dock,
the first printing had been shipped
beyond the publisher's control. To fill
additional orders, Holt had scheduled
a second print run for May 6.

on August 16, 1988) and, on August 11, 1988, a partial
judgment was entered “dismissing plaintiff's complaint
only insofar as the complaint seeks entry of a permanent
injunction.” The judgment recites that trial of the damages
issue will not be conducted in the near future; that Holt
would be “irreparably harmed” if required to await a final
judgment dispositive of all claims; that Holt is entitled to
a final judgment denying a permanent injunction; and that
“there is no just reason for delaying entry of such judgment.”
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).
Also entered in the district court on August 11, 1988 was
an order vacating the temporary restraining order but staying
the vacatur for three weeks to maintain the status quo ante
pending an application for expedited appeal. On August 30,
1988, this Court granted New Era's motion for an expedited
appeal and continued the stay until oral argument. Following
oral argument, on September 30, 1988, the stay was continued
pending the decision of this Court.

II.
The Book

New Era Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt and
Co., 684 F.Supp. 808, 809-10 (S.D.N.Y.1988).

The publisher summarizes the contents of the book in a blurb
printed on the book's jacket:

A week later, on May 20, 1988, after New Era agreed to
post an undertaking to indemnify Holt for any “unrecoverable
expenses” incurred by Holt during the period of delay,
Judge Leval granted a temporary restraining order restraining
distribution of the second printing of the book. According
to a Stipulation signed by the parties on May 31, 1988 and
approved by Judge Leval on June 3, 1988, “unrecoverable
expenses” include “a pro rata share of the overhead, with
respect to the 10,000 book second printing and any books
from the first printing returned to Holt, as a result of the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 20,
1988 and incurred with respect to the advance payment to the
author, and for advertising and publicity.”

Bare-Faced Messiah, the biography of L. Ron Hubbard,
makes for extraordinary reading. From his early days as
a penniless author of “pulp” science fiction stories to his
mysterious end, Hubbard was often in the news, usually at
odds with society, frequently in trouble with the law. Born
in 1911, the son of a struggling Nebraska businessman,
he led a wandering, wildly romantic youth in which his
dreams and his realities often became confused.

Thereafter, the parties proceeded with an expedited trial
on submissions of evidence pertaining to the permanent
injunction question. Judge Leval's opinion and order denying
the injunction was issued on August *578 9, 1988 (amended

While writing for the pulps in the 1930s he claimed
to have made a discovery of such philosophical and
psychological importance that it would change the world.
From that discovery evolved the “science” of Dianetics
which prospered briefly and then foundered in a sea of debt
and writs. In 1952 Hubbard founded a far more ambitious
program, Scientology, a new religion which claimed to
give its adepts the ability to overcome all diseases of the
mind and body....
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For nearly ten years he sailed the oceans as the commodore
of his own private navy, served by nymphet messengers in
hot pants who dressed and undressed him and were trained
like robots to relay orders in his tone of voice.

His last years were as peripatetic and unsettled as his
youth, and far more paranoid. In 1980, fearing arrest, he
disappeared and was never seen again. He died in January
1986 under circumstances as mysterious as his enigmatic
life itself.
The tone of the book is set in the author's Introduction:
For more than thirty years, the
Church of Scientology has vigorously
promoted an image of its founder,
L. Ron Hubbard, as a romantic
adventurer and philosopher whose
early life fortuitously prepared him,
in the manner of Jesus Christ, for
his declared mission to save the
world. The glorification of ‘Ron’,
superman and saviour, required a
cavalier disregard for facts: thus it
is that almost every biography of
Hubbard published by the church
is interwoven with lies, half-truths
and ludicrous embellishments. The
wondrous irony of this deception is
that the true story of L. Ron Hubbard
is much more bizarre, much more
improbable, than any of the lies.
The author purports to contrast factual and fictional accounts
of Hubbard's life in almost every chapter of the book, drawing
upon information gleaned from numerous sources: newspaper
stories and other published accounts; personal interviews;
letters; memoranda; records of various court proceedings;
materials obtained under the Freedom of Information Act
from United States government agencies; publications of
the Church of Scientology; and Hubbard's own writings,
published and unpublished. Hubbard was a prolific writer,
and *579 the biography contains liberal quotations from
his work, particularly from his unpublished early diaries and
journals.

The book proceeds in conventional chronological order,
commencing in Chapter 1 (“A Dubious Prodigy”) with
accounts of Hubbard's ancestry and early childhood. The
accounts presented by Hubbard are portrayed as exaggerated
and untrue. For example, the book contradicts Hubbard's
claims that he was descended from a French Count on his
mother's side; that he grew up on an immense cattle ranch
owned by his grandfather in Montana; and that he became a
blood brother of the Pikuni Indians before he was ten years
of age.
In Chapter 2 (“Whither did he Wander?”), the book refutes
Church of Scientology publication descriptions of Hubbard's
teenage travels, said to have been financed by a wealthy
grandfather: up and down the coast of China several times
and to Tibet (where Hubbard lived with bandits who accepted
him into their way of life); in western Manchuria (where
he demonstrated his horsemanship to ruling warlords); to an
unnamed island in the South Pacific (where he calmed the
natives by exploring a cave believed to be haunted); and in the
Philippines (where he learned in one night a native language
known as Igoroti).
Disputed in Chapter 3 (“Explorer Manqué”) are claims made
in Mission Into Time, a Church of Scientology publication,
that Hubbard: spent four years traveling in Asia; undertook
the study of nuclear physics at George Washington University
in one of the first courses ever taught in that subject at
an American university; directed, at the age of twenty,
the Caribbean Motion Picture Expedition, which provided
research for the University of Michigan and underwater films
for the Hydrographic Office; and led the West Indies Mineral
Survey, said to be the first complete mineralogical survey of
Puerto Rico. According to the book, the truth is that Hubbard
traveled in China for two months in the company of his
parents during the course of a year-long stay at the United
States Naval Station in Guam, where his father was assigned
as a naval officer; failed the course in molecular and atomic
physics at, and never graduated from, George Washington
University; started out to do research in the Caribbean on an
expedition that never was completed and never produced any
research that could be found at the University of Michigan or
the Hydrographic Office; and spent some time in Puerto Rico
but produced no known record of any mineralogical research
there.
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Both Chapters 2 and 3 include extensive quotations from
Hubbard's unpublished Asia Diaries of 1927-1929. Some
of the quotations found in these chapters are set forth in
Judge Leval's comprehensive opinion and order denying the
injunction sought by New Era. See 695 F.Supp. at 1512-13.
The Diaries also are quoted at some length in the Chapter
1 accounts of Hubbard's exploits as a Boy Scout. Id. at
1517. Seventy-three of the 132 passages from Hubbard's
unpublished writings claimed by New Era as infringing are
found in the Asia Diaries. Most of the remaining fifty-nine
passages are taken from letters written by Hubbard.
In later chapters the book treats with Hubbard's successes
as a pulp and science fiction writer, his admission to
membership in the prestigious Explorers Club, his leadership
of the “Alaskan Radio-Experimental Expedition” under the
Club's flag, and his 1941 commission as a reserve officer
in the United States Navy. It also deals with information
contradicting a number of claims made by Hubbard at various
times and repeated in authorized publications: that he studied
savage peoples and cultures in Central America between 1938
and 1941; that he was an experienced airplane pilot; that he
salvaged the careers of Boris Karloff and Bela Lugosi as a
Hollywood script writer; and that he was a seriously wounded
war hero who was awarded twenty-one medals, to identify
only a few of the contradicted claims.
The book describes how Hubbard brought to light his new
“science of Dianetics,” first in an article in the magazine
Astounding Science Fiction and then in a book entitled
Dianetics, The Modern Science of Mental Health, which
became a *580 bestseller. In Dianetics, Hubbard claimed
to have found “[t]he hidden source of all psychosomatic
ills and human aberration” and to have developed advanced
techniques to cure mental and physical illnesses. The “new
science” gained a large following, the “Hubbard Dianetic
Research Foundation” was formed, and Hubbard developed
a lucrative program for the training of auditors (practitioners)
in Dianetic Techniques.
The evolution of Dianetics into Scientology and of
Scientology into a religion is fully recounted in the book. As
founder of the Church of Scientology, Hubbard is depicted
as a charlatan and poseur whose strange religious theories
and practices were designed for the financial aggrandizement
of the Church, and ultimately of Hubbard himself. See
Foley v. Commissioner, 844 F.2d 94, 95-96 (2d Cir.1988).

Although Scientology attracted many adherents throughout
the world, Hubbard's activities generated trouble with several
governments, including the government of the United States,
which challenged the Church's claim of entitlement to taxexempt status. See Church of Scientology of California v.
Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1015, 108 S.Ct. 1752, 100 L.Ed.2d 214 (1988).
Having accumulated enormous amounts of money, according
to the narrative,
[in] 1967, L. Ron Hubbard raised
a private navy, appointed himself
Commodore, donned a dashing
uniform of his own design and set
forth on an extraordinary odyssey,
leading a fleet of ships across the
oceans variously pursued by the CIA,
the FBI, the international press and a
miscellany of suspicious government
and maritime agencies.
Hubbard was accompanied in his travels on the high seas
by his wife, children and a number of associates and
assistants. Although he resigned as President of the Church
of Scientology, he continued to conduct its affairs from his
base at sea.
Hubbard's surreptitious return to the United States is reported
at Chapter 20 (“Running Aground”) and his subsequent
excursion into producing films with Scientology themes is
described at Chapter 21 (“Making Movies”). Also described
in the latter chapter are the convictions on guilty pleas of
nine Scientologists, including Hubbard's wife, for offenses
involving the burglary of government offices and the theft of
government documents. The book intimates that Hubbard's
wife “took the rap” for a scheme that Hubbard set in motion to
purge government records of matter unfavorable to him and to
the Church of Scientology. Chapter 22 (“Missing, Presumed
Dead”) concludes the book with an account of Hubbard's
mysterious demise.
The book draws extensively upon the published writings
of Hubbard in Dianetics and Scientology as well as upon
various bulletins Hubbard issued to his followers. Judge
Leval found sixty-nine instances of the use of published
material in the biography. Since he found all but three of these
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uses noninfringing or “fair,” the opinion of the district court
focuses on the use of previously unpublished materials.

III.
District Court Opinion
Applying the rule of fair use established in the copyright law,
17 U.S.C. § 107, and explicated by the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), and by this
Court in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890, 108 S.Ct. 213, 98 L.Ed.2d
177 (1987), to the unpublished Hubbard writings quoted in
the book under examination, Judge Leval
conclude[s] that there is a body of
material of small, but more than
negligible size, which, given the
strong presumption against fair use of
unpublished material, cannot be held
to pass the fair use test
and therefore finds,
under mandate of the Salinger opinion,
that Bare-Faced Messiah to some
degree infringes Hubbard's copyrights
in some of his previously unpublished
works.
695 F.Supp. at 1524-25.
The district court's determination is arrived at after a close
examination of the *581 statutory fair use factors, which
are seen as a means of resolving “the conflict between
the justification for copying in serving the objective of
public education (in the broadest sense) and the copyright
owner's entitlement to reap the profits of labor and talent
invested in creative works.” Id. at 1500. Examining the
nature of the copyrighted work, the second statutory fair
use factor, 17 U.S.C. § 107(2), the district court opinion
reflects on the Supreme Court's observation that “the scope
of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works,”
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564, 105 S.Ct. at 2232, on our
interpretation that “[n]arrower ‘scope’ seems to refer to the

diminished likelihood that copying will be fair use when the
copyrighted material is unpublished,” Salinger, 811 F.2d at
97, and on our pronouncement that “[unpublished] works
normally enjoy complete protection against copying any
protected expression,” id. The district court, concluding that
“diminished likelihood” is not the same as “impossibility”
and that “normally” does not mean “inevitably,” concludes
that one “who purports to make a fair use of unpublished
copyrighted matter must make a particularly compelling
demonstration of justification, upon full consideration of the
relevant fair use factors.” 695 F.Supp. at 1503-04. According
to the district court, Holt has made the necessary showing
“[a]s to the great majority of items” by demonstrating “a
powerfully compelling fair use purpose.” Id. at 1523.
Turning to the first statutory fair use factor, the purpose
and character of the use, 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), the district
court opinion first reviews the overall purpose and character
of the work and then addresses the fair use purposes of
individual passages. As to the former, the court concludes
that the biography is “a serious book of responsible historical
criticism,” and therefore eligible for fair use consideration
despite “defendant's profit-making objective.” Id. at 1507. As
to the latter, the court finds a powerfully compelling fair use
purpose in using Hubbard's own words to reveal Hubbard's
character traits and the bizarre quality of his ideas.
According to the opinion, verbatim quotation is necessary
to demonstrate Hubbard's dishonesty in the accounts he
gave of his early life as put forward by the Church of
Scientology. “It is incompatible with the ends of fair research
and criticism to accuse of dishonesty without being permitted
to specify what were the dishonest words.” Id. at 1510.
Specific passages must be set out, it is said, to show the
subject's boastfulness, pomposity, grandiosity, pretension and
self-importance, because “[i]t is the subject's conception of
himself that the biographer seeks to convey.” Id. at 1512.
Hubbard's paranoia supposedly is demonstrated by certain
letters and Church bulletins. The Asia Diaries are quoted “in
mockery, to show Hubbard's bigotry, bias and coarse lack of
taste.” Id. at 1513. Cruelty and disloyalty are displayed in
two letters having to do with a bigamous marriage, and the
employment of Hubbard's words in this instance is said to
“serve[ ] a strong fair use purpose.” Id.
The book quotes from a letter written by Hubbard
to the FBI accusing his estranged wife of being a
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communist, and from bulletins written by Hubbard urging
his followers to “attack” those who oppose them, “to
illustrate Hubbard's aggressiveness and vicious scheming
tactics against perceived enemies.” Id. Cynicism is illustrated
by a letter to a confidant discussing Scientology's financial
potential and in a lecture praising the advantages of deceit.
Excerpts taken from Dianetics: The Modern Science of
Mental Health, a Hubbard work that remains a best seller,
The History of Man, a book establishing the foundations of
Scientology, and an unpublished letter boasting of Hubbard's
ability to heal are said to provide examples of derangement,
insanity and bizarre pseudo-science. There is a compelling
fair use purpose as to each of the excerpts, according to
the opinion, because “[t]he biographer/critic should not be
required simply to express ... conclusions without defending
them by example.” Id. at 1517. The opinion views with
approval the lifting of various passages from earlier works
“to illustrate Hubbard's egocentric self-perception in his early
diaries,” id., and to “convey a capsule characterization *582
of the style of Hubbard's earliest fiction writing,” id. at 1518.
As to the first statutory factor, then, the opinion concludes that
the “great majority” of quotations in the book demonstrate
“a powerfully compelling fair use purpose that could not be
accomplished without use of the subject's own words” but
that “in a few instances of quotation of unpublished material,”
there is a “much less compelling fair use justification.” Id.
at 1520. The opinion observes that the passages involved
in the “few instances” referred to “undoubtedly play a role
in filling out the biographer's portrait” and may “fall short
of demonstrating a sufficiently powerful claim of a fair use
purpose to satisfy the test of ‘narrower’ scope for unpublished
material.” Id.
Examining the third statutory factor, amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole, 17 U.S.C. § 107(3), the district court finds
New Era's count of 201 instances of infringement exaggerated
but concludes that “there remains a substantial amount of
taking of protected expression sufficient to raise a serious
problem of copyright infringement if the takings are not
protected by fair use.” Id. at 1522. In the opinion of the district
court the fourth statutory factor, effect of the use upon the
potential market value of the copyrighted work, 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(4), said by the Supreme Court to be “the single most
important element of fair use,” Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 566, 105 S.Ct. at 2233, cuts in favor of Holt. Because

the book “is a hostile, critical biography using fragmentary
extracts to demonstrate critical conclusions about” Hubbard,
one interested in reading Hubbard's writings would not be
dissuaded by the extracts from purchasing his larger works.
695 F.Supp. at 1523.
The ultimate conclusion of the opinion as to fair use is that
the use of published materials is “fair” but that the book
is infringing in “some degree” in respect of unpublished
materials. That conclusion is arrived at with some reluctance:
As to the book overall, were it
not for the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in Salinger, I would
conclude that fair use has been
adequately demonstrated.... Here the
demonstration of fair use is far
more compelling. Many of the
takings of Salinger's expression
were for the purpose of enlivening
that text with Salinger's expressive
genius.... Hubbard's expression is
taken primarily to show character
flaws in a manner that cannot be
accomplished without use of his
words.
Id. at 1524. Nevertheless, the district court identifies fortyfour passages from unpublished works “as to which a fair use
purpose is not convincingly shown,” leading it to observe:
“I cannot conclude that the Court of Appeals would accord
fair use protection to all of Miller's quotations, or that the
biography as a whole would be considered non-infringing.”
Id.
Notwithstanding its recognition of the rule that injunctions
generally are granted to prevent copyright infringement, the
district court has “no difficulty concluding that this is one
of those special circumstances in which the interests of free
speech overwhelmingly exceed the plaintiff's interest in an
injunction.” Id. at 1528. Perceiving that Salinger creates a
daunting obstacle to a fair use defense against the use of
unpublished materials, the district court discerns a need to
“focus with new intensity on the potential conflict between
the copyright and freedom of speech.” Id. at 1526. Here,
according to the opinion of the district court, an injunction
would suppress an interesting study of an important figure,
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with resultant injury to the public interest in free speech.
Under such circumstances, an injunction should be denied,
since “[a]n award of damages for profits ... can protect the
copyright holder with far less injury to the public interest
in freedom of speech than an injunction.” Id. at 1527. The
permanent injunction sought here is denied by the district
court because of the prohibitive expense and waste involved
in republishing after deletion of infringing passages, the
public's deprivation of an important historical study and the
failure of an injunction to serve any copyright interest, as well
as the *583 significant injury to free speech. Id. at 1528.

IV.
Analysis
We agree that a permanent injunction should be denied, but
for a reason wholly different from any of those set forth in the
district court's opinion. Moreover, we disagree with a great
deal of what is said in the opinion.
[1] First, we do not share some of the district court's views
respecting the proper application of the four fair use factors
in this case. It seems clear to us that the first statutory fair
use factor, purpose of the use, weighs in favor of Holt, while
the remaining three factors, nature of the copyrighted work,
amount and substantiality of the portion used, and effect of
the use upon the market, all weigh in favor of New Era. The
book under examination here is no different from the Salinger
biography in its statutory fair use purpose classification:
“criticism,” “scholarship” or “research.” See Salinger, 811
F.2d at 96. Consonant with Salinger, “we agree with the
District Court that the first fair use factor weighs in [Holt's]
favor, but not that the purpose of [its] use entitles [it] to any
special consideration.” Id. at 97. The tenor of the district court
opinion is that special consideration should be afforded to
Holt, to the extent that Hubbard's words are quoted to prove
some traits of character either at odds with his public image
or especially intriguing to the reader. The district court sees
a significant distinction in purpose between the use of an
author's words to display the distinctiveness of his writing
style and the use of an author's words to make a point about
his character, finding far greater justification in the latter than
in the former. We find such a distinction unnecessary and
unwarranted in applying the statutory fair use purpose factor.

As long as a book can be classified as a work of criticism,
scholarship or research, as can the book here, the factor cuts in
favor of the book's publisher, whether the copyrighted matter
is taken from a literary lion like J.D. Salinger or a purported
prophet like L. Ron Hubbard.
[2] The district court opinion adds a gloss to the second
fair use factor-nature of the copyrighted work-that we think
should be removed. While we made it clear in Salinger that
unpublished works normally enjoy complete protection, the
district court would parse this factor also with a distinction.
In this instance the distinction is between the use of
protected expression to “enliven” text and the use of protected
expression to communicate “significant points” about the
subject. We see no need for such an approach. Where use
is made of materials of an “unpublished nature,” the second
fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer,
and we do not do so here. “Since the copyrighted letters are
unpublished, the second factor weighs heavily in favor of
[New Era].” Id.
We agree with the district court's analysis of the third fair use
factor and with its finding that a substantial amount of taking
remains even after correcting for New Era's overcounting.
Our analysis of the fourth fair use factor, effect of the
copyrighted work, differs substantially from that of the
district court. Since the district court accepted New Era's
contention that it would commission an authorized biography
of Hubbard and that all Hubbard's writings, published and
unpublished, would be made available for that purpose, it is
difficult to conclude, as does the district court, that the book
published by Holt would have no effect on the market for
New Era's forthcoming book. We disagree with Judge Leval
on the application of the fourth fair use factor, as we did in
Salinger, finding here as we did there that “some impairment
of the market seems likely” and that “[t]he fourth fair use
factor weighs slightly in [the copyright owner's] favor.” Id.
at 99.
[3] [4] Following an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine
of fair use, the district court finds in any event that
a small, but more than negligible, body of unpublished
material cannot pass the fair use test, given the strong
presumption against fair use of unpublished work. Although
we would characterize *584 the use here as more than
“small,” it makes no difference insofar as entitlement to
injunctive relief is concerned. Since the copying of “more
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than minimal amounts” of unpublished expressive material
calls for an injunction barring the unauthorized use, id. at
96, the consequences of the district court's findings seem
obvious. Nevertheless, the district court denied an injunction
for several reasons, one being the existence of special
circumstances in which free speech interests were said to
outweigh the interests of the copyright owner. We are not
persuaded, however, that any first amendment concerns not
accommodated by the Copyright Act are implicated in this
action. Our observation that the fair use doctrine encompasses
all claims of first amendment in the copyright field, Roy
Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099-100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826, 103 S.Ct. 60, 74 L.Ed.2d 63 (1982), never has
been repudiated. See, e.g., Harper and Row, 471 U.S. at
557, 105 S.Ct. at 2229. An author's expression of an idea, as
distinguished from the idea itself, is not considered subject to
the public's “right to know.” W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege
in Copyright Law 466 (1985).
Nor are we persuaded by any of the other reasons given by the
district court for denying an injunction following its rejection
of the fair use defense and its finding of infringement. The
public would not necessarily be deprived of an “interesting
and valuable historical study,” 695 F.Supp. at 1528, but
only of an infringing one. The “prohibitive” expense of
republication after deletion of improperly included material
is without more an inevitable consequence of breach of
copyright, and, contrary to the view of the district court, a
“significant copyright interest” certainly would be served by
an injunction. The Copyright Act is, after all, a device for
carrying into effect a Congressional power firmly embedded
in our Constitution-“To promote the ... useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings ....” U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8.
[5] Nevertheless, equitable considerations dictate denial of
injunctive relief in this action. The prejudice suffered by
Holt as the result of New Era's unreasonable and inexcusable
delay in bringing the action invokes the bar of laches. See
Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804
(8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844,
64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980). In initially denying a temporary
restraining order, the district court found that New Era had
been aware since 1986 that the book would be published in the
United States. Despite this knowledge, and despite lawsuits
commenced in 1987 to enjoin publication in England, Canada

and Australia, New Era failed to compare Holt's book with
the books published abroad; failed to inquire of Holt as to
the planned date of publication in this country; and failed
to take any steps to enjoin publication of the book until it
sought a restraining order in May of 1988. At the time of the
TRO application, 12,000 copies of the book already had been
printed, packed and (except for 3,000 copies left on a loading
dock) shipped. Review copies had been sent out and a second
press run was scheduled for May 6. The district court, in its
opinion denying the TRO, commented on the delay and the
prejudicial nature of the delay:
[Holt] had made clear since Mr.
Rintoul's defiant letter in the summer
of 1986 that it had no interest
either in cooperating with [New
Era] or in entering into discussions
of infringements. There is no good
reason why [New Era] should
have waited until May [1988] to
seek provisional orders of restraint.
An earlier application would have
permitted the court to explore the
issues of law without causing [Holt]
catastrophic harm.
684 F.Supp. at 810.
If New Era promptly had sought an adjudication of its rights,
the book might have been changed at minimal cost while there
still was an opportunity to do so. At this point, however, it
appears that a permanent injunction would result in the total
destruction of the work since it is not economically feasible
to reprint the book after deletion of the infringing material.
*585 695 F.Supp. at 1528. Such severe prejudice, coupled
with the unconscionable delay already described, mandates
denial of the injunction for laches and relegation of New
Era to its damages remedy. See West Pub. Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 838 (2d Cir.1910); Hayden v.
Chalfant Press, Inc., 177 F.Supp. 303, 307 (S.D.Cal.1959),
aff'd, 281 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.1960); Blackburn v. Southern
California Gas Co., 14 F.Supp. 553, 554 (S.D.Cal.1936).

Epilogue
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The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The stay
heretofore granted by this Court is vacated. The mandate shall
issue forthwith.

OAKES, Chief Judge (concurring):
While I agree that the denial of an injunction should be
affirmed and hence concur, it seems to me unnecessary for
the majority opinion to do anything other than affirm the
denial of an injunction for laches (even though I would only
remand were that the only issue). While I do not completely
agree with Judge Leval's fair use analysis, it seems to me
the majority unnecessarily goes out of its way to take issue
with Judge Leval's opinion, New Era Publications Int'l, ApS
v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F.Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.1988).
Doing so, even by way of dictum, tends to cast in concrete
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890, 108 S.Ct. 213, 98 L.Ed.2d 177 (1987).
Salinger is a decision which, even if rightly decided on
its facts, involved underlying, if latent, privacy implications
not present here by virtue of Hubbard's death. Salinger 's
language, as here applied, confines the concept of fair use
and prevents necessary flexibility in fashioning equitable
remedies in copyright cases. I thought that Salinger might by
being taken literally in another factual context come back to
haunt us. This case realizes that concern. ‘Tis the more the
pity, since the majority's “disagree[ment] with a great deal of
[Judge Leval's] opinion,” majority op. at 583, can in a real
sense be considered dictum.
Ordinarily, in the interests of brevity I would confine this
concurrence to my points of disagreement with the majority,
relegating to an appendix my very limited disagreement with
Judge Leval on his fair use analysis. But because “[f]air use is
a mixed question of law and fact,” Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218,
2230, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), I must restate a certain amount
of background information.

I. Background
The book, Bare-Faced Messiah, is a biography of sorts,
largely based upon Freedom of Information Act materials
from U.S. Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
Intelligence Agency and other United States agency

records; numerous interviews with Scientologists, friends,
enemies, and relatives of Hubbard; newspaper stories and
published materials about the man; Hubbard's own extensive
writings, involving literally millions of words, published and
unpublished; and court records and testimony in various
tax, bankruptcy, divorce, and other proceedings. Like Judge
Leval, I believe it unnecessary to assess the accuracy of
Miller's reports or the justification for his conclusions.
Nonetheless, there is no reason, and I do not see the majority
doing otherwise, to quarrel with the judge's finding that
the book “appears to make responsible use of its material”
and hence is “a serious work of criticism and comment
on a highly newsworthy subject.” 695 F.Supp. at 1506. As
such, it is properly qualified for fair use consideration as a
work of “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ...,
scholarship, or research,” under 17 U.S.C. § 107.
It bears mention that Messiah gives due credit in the preface
to a dedicated member of the Church of Scientology for
more than a decade, one Gerry Armstrong, who, when given
permission to research an official biography of Hubbard, is
said to have gone through six filing cabinets of material, only
to become totally disillusioned with contradictory material on
Hubbard's family background, naval and academic careers,
fraudulent business background, tax evasion and *586
evasion of the law. Armstrong, who was unsuccessfully
sued by the Church, Church of Scientology of California v.
Armstrong, No. C. 420153 (Super.Ct.Cal. June 20, 1984), is
quoted as concluding that Hubbard was “a con man.” Messiah
at 6.

II. Judge Leval's Opinion
For examples of Messiah 's use of copyrighted material,
I would refer the reader to Judge Leval's comprehensive
analysis of New Era's claims. See 695 F.Supp. at 1507-22.
A long appendix to the judge's opinion provides all of the
passages in Messiah which New Era claims infringed its
copyright, the sources of those passages, and the judge's
rulings on each passage. The appendix itself was not
published in the Federal Supplement, and although I will refer
to the appendix occasionally, I do not consider it necessary to
publish it here.
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The first twenty-two pages of the Leval appendix catalog
sixty-nine quotations or references to published materials.
Of these, with only three exceptions, 1 the judge found
either that there was no infringement because the quotations
merely reported facts or ideas and the paraphrases did not use
Hubbard's manner of expression, or that there was a strong
fair use justification. Fair use was justified, Judge Leval said,
because some of these passages embodied false mythology
about Hubbard; Hubbard's dishonesty; his boastfulness,
pomposity, or pretension; his paranoia; his snobbery, bigotry,
disdain for Asians, or dislike of the Orient; his cruelty
or disloyalty; his aggressiveness, viciousness, or scheming
tactics; his cynicism; or his derangement, insanity, or bizarre
pseudo-science. Judge Leval found that other passages were
necessary to render Hubbard's ideas accurately or to display
his early writing style or presentation of himself. Judge Leval
considered all of these reasons for quoting Hubbard directly
because they have bearing on “the purpose and character of
the use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). In setting forth these different
categories of fair use, Judge Leval referred to the statute,
which permits use “for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching ..., scholarship, or research.” Id.
§ 107 (emphasis added to show statutory terms not all
inclusive); see 695 F.Supp. at 1505. The opinion also notes
that “[a]lthough plaintiff does not concede justification for
the quotations from the previously published works, it no
doubt recognizes that defendant's claims of fair use as to those
materials are extremely powerful.” 695 F.Supp. at 1498. New
Era's fire on appeal is not directed at Judge Leval's findings
on the published material, but its brief does mention that fair
use does not extend to multiple, excessive, or less important
illustrations of Hubbard's characteristics, as Judge Leval's
opinion itself recognized. See id. at 1524. New Era does not,
however, support this suggestion with specific examples.
1

The three exceptions, where quotations of Hubbard's
published writings were found to be not fairly used,
are de minimis or insignificant under the other fair
use factors such as marketability. Warner Bros., Inc.
v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242
(2d Cir.1983); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293
F.Supp.130, 146 (S.D.N.Y.1968); Meredith Corp. v.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F.Supp. 686, 689
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1221 (2d Cir.1974). (Judge
Leval did not refer directly to these three passages, but
presumably he too thought that they were de minimis.)
The first two passages are from a 1960 Hubbard

Communications Office Bulletin, the first quoting the
clause “a person named Richard M. Nixon” and the
second reading as follows: “We want clean hands in
public office in the United States. Let's begin doggedly
denying Nixon the presidency no matter what his Secret
Service tries to do to us now.... He hates us and has
used what police force was available to him to say so.
So please get busy on it.” The third consists of two
sentences quoted from Hubbard's book, Mission Into
Time: “Hearing of L. Ron Hubbard's plans for further
exploration and research into, among other things, past
civilizations, many Scientologists wanted to join him
and help. They adopted the name ‘Sea Organization.’ ”
With respect to Judge Leval, much of this last quotation
could well have been treated as non-infringing because
it involves fact.

This appeal instead concerns quotations from the unpublished
Hubbard writings. Judge Leval's appendix lists 132 passages
from unpublished works which New Era claims infringed its
copyright. Seventy-three of these came from Hubbard's Asia
Diaries written in 1927-29, when Hubbard was a young man.
Most of the Asia Diaries *587 passages quoted appear in
chapters 2 and 3 of Messiah. Most of the remaining fifty-nine
passages from unpublished works came from letters: Six were
in one letter (to his first wife) dated July 21, 1939; twelve
were in four letters to a follower, Helen O'Brien; one was
in an internal memo to a press officer; two were in a letter
(apparently dated 1971) to his daughter Alexis disavowing
that he was her father; and the rest were in letters sent to
the Secretary of War offering Hubbard's services in World
War II, to the FBI (mainly deprecating his second wife), to
the VA seeking to upgrade his World War II pension, to
an Alaskan bank cashier explaining why Hubbard had not
paid a note, and to the FBI or the President of the United
States seeking to ingratiate himself or Scientology. There is
also a quotation from Hubbard's proposed Constitution for
the Nation of Rhodesia and a paraphrase of a dispatch to
Hubbard's Scientology followers at Saint Hill, England.
Judge Leval found that 91 of the 132 passages from
unpublished works were fairly used or did not infringe upon
the unpublished Hubbard writings and that the remaining 41
were unfairly used. The Asia Diaries were the source of all but
four of those unfairly used passages. Set out in the margin is a
table which summarizes Messiah 's use of Hubbard's writing
and Judge Leval's findings. 2
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2

Nor should a biographer/critic be limited to
stating her conclusions about the subject's choice
of words. It would be preposterous to restrict
Miller to writing something like, “Hubbard used
a vulgar derogatory epithet exhibiting snobbish
bigoted disdain for the Chinese.” That would be
at once unfair to the biographer, the subject, and
the readership, which can reasonably demand to
know “What did he say? Let us be the judge of
whether it was vulgar, snobbish or bigoted.”
695 F.Supp. at 1524 (citation omitted).

Summary of Bare-Faced Messiah 's use of published and
unpublished materials and of Judge Leval's findings
Noninfringement
or fair
Unfair
use found use found
by Judge by Judge
Leval
Leval Totals
Use of published

66

3

69

91

41

132

materials
Use of unpublished
materials
(of which: from Asia

(36 )

(37 )

(73 )

Diaries)
Totals

157

44

201

Judge Leval's principal conclusions on the unpublished works
may be summarized as follows:
1. The first conclusion. Harper & Row, supra, and Salinger,
supra, do not preclude a finding of fair use as to unpublished
materials, but they do argue strongly against it and place a
burden on the user to “establish a highly convincing case in
favor of fair use.” 695 F.Supp. at 1523. With this the majority
cannot and does not disagree.
2. The second conclusion. Holt met its burden in this case
as to the great majority of unpublished materials. Salinger
and Judge Leval's own Craft v. Kobler, 667 F.Supp. 120
(S.D.N.Y.1987), cases in which the biographer “has used the
lively expression of his subject to enliven the biography,”
695 F.Supp. at 1523, can be distinguished from this case,
where the personal traits of Hubbard could not be shown
without using the subject's own words, because the value of
the passages quoted in Messiah “lies precisely in the subject's
choice of words-not as a matter of literary expression-but for
what the choice of words reveals about the subject.” Id. at
1524. A prime example is the quotation from Hubbard's Asia
Diaries: “The trouble with China is, there are too many chinks
here.” 3 The majority apparently rejects this approach of
Judge Leval; if the work is unpublished the majority considers
under the second fair use test-the nature of the unpublished
work-that protection follows as of course. Majority op. at 583.
I disagree.

3. The third conclusion. As to the book overall, Judge
Leval found that fair use was adequately demonstrated, far
*588 more compelling than in Salinger (which reversed
Judge Leval's district court opinion, Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 650 F.Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y.1986)). But, given
Salinger, and its strong presumption against finding fair use
for unpublished materials, Judge Leval went on to concede,
perhaps Messiah uses too many examples or in some cases
insufficiently effective or important ones to demonstrate
Hubbard's characteristics. This required a finding of “some
degree” of infringement. 695 F.Supp. at 1524-25. The
majority agrees though saying that the use here was “more
than ‘small.’ ” Majority op. at 583. I totally disagree. Out of
the millions of Hubbard's words the use was infinitesimal. In
comparison to Messiah as a whole, the unfair use was tiny,
indeed insignificant.
4. The fourth conclusion. While an injunction ordinarily
issues to prevent copyright infringement, Judge Leval found
this case “drastically different,” since (1) Messiah was not
an example of “profiteering by appropriating the creative
effort and genius of another” or other “opportunistic free
riding”; (2) the infringing portions are “insignificant”; and (3)
an injunction would “diminish public knowledge,” so First
Amendment concerns are implicated. Id. at 1525. Therefore,
Judge Leval concluded, all of the circumstances of this case
required the denial of a permanent injunction. The majority
disagrees. Majority op. at 584-585. 4 I totally disagree with
the majority.
4

3

[A]s to Hubbard's sentence, “The trouble with China
is, there are too many Chinks here,” there is no fact
reported in it which the biographer has an interest in
narrating. What is interesting is that Hubbard said it.

I note that Judge Leval, in so holding, declined to
rely on two factors alluded to in the briefs on appeal.
First, Judge Leval did not rely on the fact that most
of the unpublished materials here at issue-including the
Asia Diaries-became part of a court record and in that
sense were published in the California Superior Court
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litigation in which the Church sought to recover them
I need not here review the background of the defense of fair
from its member Armstrong who it claimed had taken
use. There is a very good book on the subject, one that has
them without permission. Judge Leval decided that any
been cited by the United States Supreme Court and is referred
display of those materials in the California litigation
to by the majority. See W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in
was over the Church's objection and that, as a matter
Copyright Law (1985) (hereinafter Patry); Harper & Row,
of principle, being forced to sacrifice a right in order
471 U.S. at 554, 105 S.Ct. at 2227. The leading treatise covers
to bring a lawsuit to enforce it would make the right
the fair use defense in depth. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright
chimerical. 695 F.Supp. at 1500 n. 3. An uncontroverted
§ 13.05, at 13-62.4 to -129 (1988) (hereinafter Nimmer ).
affidavit in the record provides further support for Judge
The Copyright Act itself lists four non-exclusive factors-I
Leval's position: for all practical purposes the documents
emphasize non-exclusive-to consider in this inquiry. These
in the California case were at almost all times under seal,
include, of course, the purpose and character of the use, the
subject to court order, not copied and ultimately returned
nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality
to the Church after the settlement of Armstrong's crossof the portion used in relation to the copyrighted *589 work
claim against the Church.
Second, Judge Leval did not rely on the fact that, as
as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market
New Era argued in the district court, the private nature
for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
of the Hubbard documents should favor a finding of
Section 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a
infringement. He pointed out that “the protection of
particular use is fair. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549, 105
privacy is not the function of our copyright law.”
S.Ct. at 2224-25. Fair use is an “equitable rule of reason.”
Id. at 1504. While an action under state law for a
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
violation of the right of privacy is not preempted by
U.S. 417, 448 & n. 31, 104 S.Ct. 774, 792 & n. 31, 78
the Copyright Act, such a right is not available once
L.Ed.2d 574 (1984) (quoting from H.R.Rep. No. 94-1476,
the subject of the publication is deceased, particularly
at 65 (1976)); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551,
where the writer was a public figure like Hubbard.
105 S.Ct. at 2226 (emphasizing the “equitable nature” of
Id. Case law supports Judge Leval's view that a
the fair use doctrine). The doctrine “permits courts to avoid
person's privacy right terminates at death. Cordell v.
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion,
Detective Publication, Inc., 419 F.2d 989, 990-91 (6th
Cir.1969); Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
F.2d 418, 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883,
to foster.” 471 U.S. at 550 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. at 2225 n. 3
86 S.Ct. 176, 15 L.Ed.2d 124 (1965); United States
(quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American
v. Amalgamated Life Ins. Co., 534 F.Supp. 676, 679
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1980)).
(S.D.N.Y.1982); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F.Supp. 29,
37 (S.D.N.Y.1974); aff'd in relevant part, 560 F.2d
Because Salinger is not the beginning and the end of fair
1061 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013, 98
use law, previous Second Circuit cases involving biographies,
S.Ct. 727, 54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978).
public figures and public information do, I think, need
If, as some commentators have suggested, e.g., Note,
reference. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Fair Use of Unpublished Materials in the Second
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.1966), rev'g 256 F.Supp. 55
Circuit: The Letters of the Law, 54 Brooklyn L.Rev.
(S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009, 87 S.Ct. 714, 17
417, 457-60 (1988), tacit concerns for Salinger's
L.Ed.2d 546 (1967), involved a biography of Howard Hughes
privacy in some way informed the Salinger opinion,
and allegations that Hughes was attempting to suppress
those concerns are not present here. On privacy and
the law of copyright, see Judge Newman's informative
unfavorable publicity. After learning that Random House
Manges lecture, in 12 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts
was considering publication of a biography, Hughes granted
459, 460 n. 2 (1988), refuting the commentators'
a friendly Nevada corporation, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc.,
suggestion.
an exclusive contract to publish and sell his authorized

III. Discussion
A. Fair Use Doctrine

biography, Rosemont then purchased the copyrights to
articles about Hughes that had appeared in Look magazine
in 1954. After Random House published its biography,
Rosemont brought suit for the infringement of the Look
articles, claiming that the Look articles were copied at least
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forty-one times. 256 F.Supp. at 61. The district court found
that the taking was substantial in quantity and quality and
granted a preliminary injunction. Id. at 64, 68. This court
reversed in an opinion by Judge Moore:
Whether the privilege may justifiably
be applied to particular materials turns
initially on the nature of the materials,
e.g., whether their distribution would
serve the public interest in the
free dissemination of information and
whether their preparation requires
some use of prior materials dealing
with the same subject matter.
366 F.2d at 307. That is to say, the second use must serve the
public interest and must require use of the original work. Cf.
Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.Supp.
1269, 1275 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (film did not need to use books
on life of Lenny Bruce, and use did not serve public interest;
Rosemont distinguished). 5
5

Mention should also be made of the “concurring” opinion
in Rosemont of Chief Judge Lumbard-an opinion joined
by Judge Hays-which looked to the equitable doctrine
of clean hands in light of Hughes' alleged attempt to
suppress unfavorable biographies, 366 F.2d at 311-13.
Judge Leval did not consider the doctrine of
unclean hands, though the English trial court
which denied an interim injunction sought by the
Church of Scientology against Messiah 's author
and Penguin Books said that the Church's litigation
was “oppressive” and “not bona fide launched to
protect any legitimate interest of the church in
preserving confidentiality in information contained in
Mr. Miller's biography.” Church of Scientology of
California v. Miller, slip op. at 16 (Ch. Oct. 9, 1987),
aff'd, Ch. 1986 C. No. 6140 (C.A. Oct. 22, 1987).
Were appellants to have prevailed on this appeal, the
allegations presented in the affidavit of W. Mallory
Rintoul, Esq., the Secretary and General Counsel of
Henry Holt and Company, Inc., in the joint appendix
at 883 with attached materials, would in my opinion
have called for an examination of the “clean hands”
of appellants. This, like the majority's consideration of
laches, necessarily follows from the fact that New Era
sought injunctive relief; these are equitable defenses

to an equitable remedy, sought in connection with an
equitable doctrine.

Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F.Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y.1968), involved the famous Zapruder film of
the assassination of President Kennedy. A book published
by Bernard Geis Associates, Six Seconds in Dallas, used
charcoal sketches of the Zapruder frames, then owned by Life
magazine, which had improperly been photographed by a Life
employee who wrote the book. The district court emphasized
the strong public interest in making available *590 the
fullest information about the murder of President Kennedy,
293 F.Supp. at 146, but may not have properly evaluated the
potential economic harm to the owner of the copyright in
granting summary judgment to the defendants, see Patry at
98-100.
Meeropol v. Nizer was a series of cases brought by the sons
of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg to restrain Louis Nizer's book,
The Implosion Conspiracy. In the first Meeropol v. Nizer, 361
F.Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.1973), Judge Tyler denied a motion
to restrain Nizer pendente lite from infringing upon a claimed
copyright in the Rosenbergs' letters which had been published
in a 1953 book, but which had been out of print for nearly
twenty years. The court cited Rosemont 's public interest
and necessity tests. Id. at 1067-68. It found a continuing
public interest in the Rosenberg case, that the letters were
important to any serious book on the subject, and that the
selections from the letters were used “with discretion and
with demonstrable purpose to illustrate, from an historical and
legal point of view, the post-conviction appeals and petitions
for clemency which were filed by and for Mr. and Mrs.
Rosenberg.” Id. at 1068. An appeal was taken, but apparently
dropped, see Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F.Supp. 1201, 1203 n.
1 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 560 F.2d 1061
(2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 727, 54
L.Ed.2d 756 (1978).
On an expanded record in 1976, the Meeropols' supplemental
complaint was heard on a motion by defendants for summary
judgment. Id. at 1203. Judge Gagliardi held, not altogether
persuasively to some, see Patry at 79-80:
[C]ourts in recent years have come to
recognize that there are occasionally
situations in which the copyright
holder's interest in a maximum
financial return must occasionally be
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subordinated to the greater public
interest in the development of arts,
science, and industry.
417 F.Supp. at 1206. Our court reversed, finding that fair use
was not established as a matter of law and that genuine issues
of fact existed which precluded summary judgment. These
issues were the purposes for which Nizer used quotations
from the Rosenberg letters and the effect of that use upon
the future market for the letters. 560 F.2d 1061, 1070
(2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 727,
54 L.Ed.2d 756 (1978). Judge Smith's opinion for this
court stated that the inquiry on remand should determine
“whether or not the Rosenberg letters were used primarily for
scholarly, historical reasons or predominantly for commercial
exploitation.” Id. at 1069. The key issue was “whether the
defendant's work tends to diminish or prejudice the potential
sale of plaintiff's work.” Id. at 1070 (fact that letters quoted
were out of print “does not necessarily mean that they have
no future market which can be injured”). Thus, Meeropol
qualified Rosemont to a certain extent, and it cannot be
overlooked in the analysis that follows.
Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.1980), involved
ABC's use in its coverage of the 1972 Olympics of twoand-one-half minutes of film from a twenty-eight-minute
biographical film about a wrestler at Iowa State who
ultimately won a gold medal. In affirming the opinion of
Judge Lumbard, sitting as a district judge, 463 F.Supp.
902 (S.D.N.Y.1978), the Court of Appeals said that “[t]he
fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft,
empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it
determines the underlying work contains material of possible
public importance.” In this regard, it was relevant that the
copyrighted material was used for commercial purposes. 621
F.2d at 61. The Iowa State court also rejected a purely
quantitative approach for determining whether the copying
is insignificant, id. at 61-62, a factor which I also consider
important.
Finally, in Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 826, 103 S.Ct. 60, 74 L.Ed.2d 63 (1982),
this court rejected a news broadcaster's claim that it had a
First Amendment right to use portions of Charlie Chaplin's
films in the broadcast coverage of Chaplin's death. Judge

Newman's opinion *591 for the court quoted Wainwright
Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 95 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98
S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978), as stating the general
rule that “ ‘[c]onflicts between interests protected by the
first amendment and the copyright laws thus far have been
resolved by application of the fair use doctrine.’ ” 672 F.2d
at 1100.
In sum, before Salinger the Second Circuit recognized that
public interest in the subject matter and the necessity for
the use are important components of fair use, and that the
fair use doctrine is an appropriate way to resolve conflicts
between copyright law and the First Amendment. At the same
time, the commercial motives of a user will count against fair
use, and so will the likelihood of undermining the market for
the protected work. A court should consider the use in both
quantitative and qualitative terms. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Harper & Row, more attention has been
given to the additional issue of how significant it is that the
material copied was unpublished.

B. Fair Use in Messiah
Neither appellant nor the majority opinion disputes Judge
Leval's conclusion about Hubbard's published works: that all
the quotations or paraphrases from these works were either
non-infringing or fairly used (or implicitly de minimis, see
note 1 supra ). 6 Rather, New Era's principal argument and the
majority opinion concern Hubbard's unpublished writings.
The claim is that Judge Leval's conclusion that the fair use
doctrine justifies Holt's use of portions of these writings is
contrary to Harper & Row and “eviscerates” Salinger. The
majority agrees with New Era (majority op. at 583) that the
district court's consideration of the first section 107 factor-the
purpose and character of the use-is premised on an illusory
distinction between quotations used merely to “enliven”
a biographer's work and quotations that are essential to
communicate significant points about the character of the
subject. Judge Leval, the argument runs, improperly thought
that it was necessary to quote Hubbard to communicate
character traits such as dishonesty, boastfulness, pretention,
and the like.
6

New Era does question-the majority does not-whether
letters filed with various government agencies or
applications thereto should be considered published,
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since Hubbard sent them to the agencies before the
the subject's supporters have attempted to project. As Judge
Freedom of Information Act was adopted. Holt argues,
Leval said, it may be “the words used by [a] public figure (or
on the other hand, that Hubbard's letter or applications to
the particular manner of expression) that are the facts calling
government agencies were published.
for comment.” 695 F.Supp. at 1502. This is entirely consistent
I think that Holt has the better of the argument.
with the Supreme Court's comment in Harper & Row that
While before the FOIA the letters may have been
quotations may be “necessary adequately to convey the facts.”
sent with an expectation of privacy, that expectation
In that case, for example, President Ford's characterization of
no longer existed after Hubbard's death. Moreover,
certain White House tapes as the “smoking gun” was “perhaps
publication occurred in a very real sense when
so integral to the idea expressed as to be inseparable from it.”
Hubbard wrote the government agency or official in
471 U.S. at 563, 105 S.Ct. at 2232.
question. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577
(1977) (publication of defamatory material). Finally,
I agree with Judge Leval: words that are facts calling for
the FOIA does not apply only to materials that arrived
comment are distinguishable from words that simply enliven
in government files after its enactment.
To be sure, the act of placing a “work” in a public file
text. The law recognizes that words themselves may be
where it is available for inspection is not a publication
facts to be proven. For example, in evidence law, words
under 17 U.S.C. § 101, at least after January 1,
of independent legal significance, such as a contract or
1978, 1 Nimmer §§ 4.07, at 4-39 to -40, 4.10 at
slander, are verbal acts and not hearsay. See McCormick
4-49 and cases cited, because the work has not been
on Evidence § 249, at 732-33 (3d ed. 1984). According to
distributed. Nonetheless, although case law on this
Messiah, Hubbard lied, boasted, etc. These are actions. In
is nonexistent, I think that letters or applications to
order to prove his point, Messiah 's author must recount those
government agencies seeking or promoting action by
actions-i.e., he must quote Hubbard's lies, boasts, etc. Thus,
the agencies are not “works of authorship” in the
in Salinger 's words, see 811 F.2d at 97, Messiah seeks, in
copyright sense of 17 U.S.C. § 102. Cf. id. § 2.03[A],
quoting Hubbard's writings, to “report[ ] only the fact of what
at 2-24 (Congress did not use its full constitutional
[Hubbard] did.”
powers over “writings” in the Act).

It is true that Salinger said that a “biographer has no
inherent right to copy the ‘accuracy’ or the ‘vividness' of the
letter writer's expression. Indeed, ‘vividness of expression’
is precisely an attribute of the author's expression that he
is entitled to protect.” 811 F.2d at 96. Salinger goes on to
quote the defendant in that case as stating, when asked why
he copied a stylistic device of Salinger's, that he wanted to
convey the fact that Salinger was adopting an ironic tone. The
biographer was then asked whether he could have stated that
Salinger had an ironic tone; he responded that “ ‘[t]hat would
make a pedestrian sentence I didn't wish to put my name to.’ ”
Id. Judge Newman, writing for the Salinger panel, concluded:
“[W]hen dealing with copyrighted expression, a biographer
(or any other copier) may frequently have to content himself
with reporting only the fact of what his subject did, even if
he *592 thereby pens a ‘pedestrian’ sentence. The copier is
not at liberty to avoid ‘pedestrian’ reportage by appropriating
his subject's literary devices.” Id. at 96-97. While this passage
could be read broadly, as apparently the majority does, I do
not think that it reaches the case where the biographer or critic
is using the protected expression as a fact to prove a character
trait that is at odds with the public image that the subject or

Judge Leval offers a colorful hypothetical to support this
argument: a popular, benign mayor who has sent memoranda
to opponents in various conflicts threatening to “cut your
heart out,” “castrate you,” and “bust your kneecaps.” 695
F.Supp. at 1502. A journalist questioning the accuracy of
the mayor's public image might well quote from these
memoranda since it would be very difficult, if not impossible,
to convey the fact that the mayor was not the benign
character he was thought to be without these particular
words or expressions. Another of Judge Leval's examples
fits the Messiah quotations quite closely: A religious leader
renowned for his selfless kindness, liberality of spirit and
sympathy for the sufferings of others might well be exposed
by extracts from his letters and journals which displayed
greed or callous indifference and employed the language
of racial and religious bigotry. Id. Thus, in considering the
first of the factors identified by Congress and the courts-the
purpose and character of the use-unlike the majority, I think
the district court made an appropriate distinction between this
case and Salinger.
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There are a few quotations which I nevertheless concede
are indistinguishable from those held to be improper in
Salinger, and here I part company-but only a little-from
Judge Leval. There are, for example, quotations from eight
passages in short-story outlines and drafts to show Hubbard's
teenage style of writing. The district court thought that these
quotations could properly be used. Salinger makes it very
clear, however, that quotations used merely to demonstrate
writing style may not qualify for the fair use defense. 811 F.2d
at 96-97. Quotations from those eight passages, then, are not
fairly used. Nevertheless, they do not-unlike the quotations
from Salinger's letters-“make the book worth reading.” Id.
at 99. Rather, they serve only in a very limited way as
background information. The majority opinion disregards this
distinction.
As to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
Harper & Row says that “the scope of fair use is narrower with
respect to unpublished works” because “the author's right to
control the first public appearance of his expression weighs
against such use of the work before its release.” Thus, the fact
that a work is unpublished is a “critical element of its ‘nature.’
” 471 U.S. at 564, 105 S.Ct. at 2232.
Salinger interpreted narrower “scope” to refer to the
“diminished likelihood that *593 copying will be fair use
when the copyrighted material is unpublished,” on the theory
that these passages in Harper & Row convey the idea
that unpublished works normally enjoy complete protection
against copying. 811 F.2d at 97. I accept this as the holding
of Salinger, which we are bound to follow absent en banc
review, even though Salinger itself recognized that at least
one other interpretation might be given to the Supreme Court's
statements in Harper & Row: the Court might have meant that
lesser amounts of copyrighted material can be copied from
unpublished works than from published works. Nevertheless,
I do not think that Harper & Row, as glossed by Salinger,
leads to the inevitable conclusion that all copying from
unpublished work is per se infringement. By referring to a
diminished “likelihood,” Salinger suggests that there may be
some instances-even though less likely-where copying will be
fair use. For the Supreme Court in Harper & Row to say that
“the scope of fair use is narrower” was quite different from
saying that there is no scope at all. Furthermore, when Harper
& Row said that the unpublished nature of a work should be a
“key, though not necessarily determinative, factor” in fair use
analysis, 471 U.S. at 554, 105 S.Ct. at 2227 (quoting S.Rep.

No. 94-473, at 64 (1975)), it implicitly renounced a per se
rule. Indeed, the statute itself does not distinguish between
published and unpublished works.
The second factor, as I see it, helps to define the burden that
is placed upon a defendant to justify its use of copyrighted
material. Holt must justify its use more convincingly under
section 107's other factors when quoting from Hubbard's
unpublished writings than when quoting from his published
works. See 695 F.Supp. at 1504.
The third factor is the amount and substantiality of the
portion of the copyrighted work used. Paraphrase as well as
actual quotation must be considered. Salinger, 811 F.2d at
97-98. We must also examine the amount and substantiality
of the passages at issue both in relation to the protected
work and in relation to the work accused of infringement.
Salinger found that the Hamilton biography there involved
copied a considerable amount from forty-four letters by J.D.
Salinger: protected sequences constituted at least one-third
of seventeen letters, and at least ten percent of forty-two
letters. Id. 811 F.2d at 98-99. And I agree that the amount
copied may be small, but still substantial. The Supreme
Court in Harper & Row pointed out that, while in absolute
terms the words quoted were an insubstantial portion of the
protected work, what was taken was nevertheless “essentially
the heart of the book,” 471 U.S. at 564-65, 105 S.Ct. at
2232-33 (quoting the district court opinion, 557 F.Supp.
at 1072). Also important is the contribution of the quoted
material to the work accused of infringement. Salinger found
that the taking there was significant qualitatively as well as
quantitatively: Salinger's letters were quoted or paraphrased
on approximately 40 percent of the biography's 192 pages,
and they, “[t]o a large extent ... make the book worth reading.”
Id. at 99. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566, 105 S.Ct.
at 2233-34 (referring to the “key role in the infringing work”
of excerpts taken from the protected work).
The amount and substantiality of the quotations used in this
case are easily distinguishable from Harper & Row and
Salinger, a matter which the majority opinion unfortunately
glosses over. I have said that the quotations from the
Asia Diaries are mostly found in Chapters 2 and 3, which
deal in part with Hubbard's travels. Qualitatively, they are
quite insignificant: as I mentioned above, the quotations
are necessary to substantiate the author's factual assertions.
However, they are not nearly so important as, in Salinger

© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

17

Roffer, Michael 8/5/2015
For Educational Use Only

New Era Publications Intern., ApS v. Henry Holt and Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576 (1989)
57 USLW 2658, 1989 Copr.L.Dec. P 26,415, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561...

's words, to “make the book worth reading.” 811 F.2d at
99. Quantitatively, the quotations are but a fraction of the
Asia Diaries: they are hardly “the heart” of the work, as
was the case in Harper & Row. The diaries are not in our
record, but there is an affidavit that states that they contain
some 46,299 words, of which only a very small portion is
quoted in Messiah. The quotations are also a small fraction
of two chapters *594 in Messiah which, in turn, constitute
32 pages out of a 375-page book. Thus, the Asia Diaries
quotations, in my view, satisfy the third factor of the fair use
test. The same perhaps does not hold true of the letters to
Helen O'Brien or to Hubbard's former spouse. The quotations
used in Messiah are the heart of those letters, which weighs
against a finding of fair use for those quotations-even though
their publication does help Miller in his attempt to expose
Hubbard as a hypocritical, cynical, and scheming personality.
But none of these section 107 factors is exclusive, as we are
all aware.
I now turn to the fourth factor set out in section 107, “the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.” Harper & Row tells us that
this “is undoubtedly the single most important element of
fair use.” 471 U.S. at 566, 105 S.Ct. at 2233-34. Thus,
we must assess the potential market for Hubbard's letters
and the utilized portions of his Asia Diaries. Here the
majority and I completely part company. As I see it, the
district court correctly found that one who has an interest in
reading Hubbard's writings-whether one is “for” or “against”
Hubbard-would not satisfy that interest by reading BareFaced Messiah or the quotations in it. In my view it would be
clear to any reader of Messiah “that she had not literally read
Hubbard's writings,” but, rather, that she had read a “hostile,
critical biography using fragmentary extracts to demonstrate
critical conclusions about him.” 695 F.Supp. at 1523. The
district court found, and I agree, that “readers would not
be dissuaded from purchasing Hubbard's work by Miller's
extracts,” and that “Miller's use of Hubbard's writings will
not affect the market for Hubbard's copyrights.” Id. I see
no reason, nor does the majority give us any indication
(op. at 583), why this finding of fact is clearly erroneous,
especially since the executor of Hubbard's estate testified that
no appraisal had been done of Hubbard's unpublished works.
The executor also acknowledged that “any biography that
is not objectively favorable to Mr. Hubbard” would not be
approved for publication, while claiming that Messiah was a
“scumbag book” and “full of bullshit.” Gready Aff. Ex A. at

84, 94, 105. Letters such as those to O'Brien or to Hubbard's
ex-wife stand so little chance of publication by Hubbard's
legatees that their quotation in Messiah will not impair the
market for any publication that might later be approved by the
legatees. The majority does not and cannot suggest otherwise.
The Asia Diaries, on the other hand, would undoubtedly have
a market with Hubbard aficionados despite the publication
of excerpts from them in Messiah. It is therefore not at all
difficult to distinguish this case from Salinger, where the
copying of Salinger's letters made likely “some impairment
of the market.” 811 F.2d at 99. To the extent that Messiah
's criticism of L. Ron Hubbard diminishes the popularity
of Scientology or impedes the sale of Hubbard's books
pertaining to Dianetics or the Church of Scientology or its
teachings, Messiah may be said to affect their marketability
adversely. This sort of effect, of course, is not a factor either
in a fair use assessment or in a determination of an appropriate
remedy, since the Copyright Act does not protect any such
interest. The majority errs when it says that “it is difficult to
conclude, as does the district court, that the book published
by Holt would have no effect on the market for New Era's
forthcoming book.” (Op. at 19 (emphasis added).) In fact,
it is the effect of Messiah 's use of copyrighted material,
not the effect of the book as a whole, that must be assessed
here. Judge Leval carefully adhered to this distinction when
considering section 107's fourth factor. See 695 F.Supp. at
1522-23.
Thus, I agree with the district court's ultimate conclusion that
most of the material, including all of the published and much
of the unpublished writings, is entitled to the fair use defense.
I also agree with Judge Leval that the unpublished material
that is not entitled to this defense is both quite small in
quantity and most limited in quality, and that its marketability
would in no way be affected by the publication of Messiah.
To hold otherwise is in *595 my view also to engage in the
appellate factfinding prohibited by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.

C. The Remedy
I come then to the truly critical question which the
majority opinion, starting with different premises, deals
with by reference solely to the Act and its constitutional
underpinning: does the publication of even a small, but
more than negligible, body of infringing material entitle the
copyright holder to an injunction? The district court refused
to enjoin further distribution of Bare-Faced Messiah. 695
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F.Supp. at 1525-28. The court fully recognized that, while
an injunction is a drastic remedy, Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1802-03, 72
L.Ed.2d 91 (1982), courts will readily find the requisite threat
of irreparable injury in copyright cases, see, e.g., Wainwright
Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,
94 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730,
54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978). However, Judge Leval found that
this was not a typical case of “opportunistic free riding.”
The copyright infringement here did not involve “profiteering
by appropriating the creative effort and genius of another.”
695 F.Supp. at 1525. In other words, the injury here was
not irreparable. It is not a simple case of stealing another's
expressions for personal advantage.
Rather, the suppression of Messiah would, as Judge Leval
said, operate as a prior restraint and “implicate[ ] concerns
of the First Amendment.” Id. Judge Leval observed that
earlier cases (e.g., Rosemont, Meeropol ) avoided suppressing
critical biographies by finding fair use. “Since Salinger,”
however, the conflict between freedom of speech and the
injunctive remedy is “inescapable.” Id. at 1526. The judge
concluded, and I agree, that “[t]here may ... be instances
where solicitude for the author's commercial entitlements,
especially in first publication, will motivate a court to protect
his compensation right by denying a finding of fair use, while
solicitude for a free press and free public discussion will
require denial of an injunction.” Id. He supported this view
by citing the permissive language of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 502 (the court “may ... grant ... final injunctions”);
past cases, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209
U.S. 20, 23-24, 28 S.Ct. 335, 337, 52 L.Ed. 663 (1908)
(discretion “wisely exercised” in copyright infringement case
in refusing injunction against publisher of reference book
with “insignificant” improper uses); and the vote of four
justices in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499, 104 S.Ct. 774, 818, 78 L.Ed.2d
574 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (award of damages, or
continuing royalties or even some form of limited injunction
“may well be an appropriate means of balancing the equities
in this case”). Judge Leval also distinguished Harper & Row
and Salinger. The former did not involve the issuance of
an injunction; and while the latter did grant a preliminary
injunction, the question whether a permanent injunction
should issue was not raised. 695 F.Supp. at 1526. Finally,
Judge Leval cited Professor Nimmer for the proposition that
“where great public injury would be worked by an injunction,

the courts might follow cases in other areas of property law[,]
and award damages [or] a continuing royalty instead of an
injunction under such special circumstances.” Id. at 1528; see
3 Nimmer § 14.06[B], at 14-56.2. In short, the judge decided
that this was “one of those special circumstances in which the
interests of free speech overwhelmingly exceed the plaintiff's
interest in an injunction.” 695 F.Supp. at 1528.
I recognize the counter from Salinger that “[i]f [an
author] copies more than minimal amounts of (unpublished)
expressive content, he deserves to be enjoined,” 811
F.2d at 96, and that “[m]isapplication of the appropriate
legal principles constitutes grounds for overturning the
denial or issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Id. at
94. I am also aware that Judge Leval's mention of First
Amendment concerns may not be easy to reconcile with
the Supreme Court's statements in Harper & Row that “[i]t
is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest
importance *596 to the public. Such a notion ignores the
major premise of copyright and injures author and public
alike,” 471 U.S. at 559, 105 S.Ct. at 2230, and that The
Nation 's First Amendment defense “would expand fair use
to effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection
in the work of a public figure,” id. at 557, 105 S.Ct. at 2229.
Finally, I am aware of this court's observation in Roy Export,
672 F.2d at 1099, that “[n]o Circuit that has considered
the question ... has ever held that the First Amendment
provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the
accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.” See also
Patry, ch. 18: because copyright protects the expression of
an idea but not the idea itself, “the only possible conflict
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act lies in
the author's expression, viz., his individual characterization,
phrasing, or styling of ideas. No court has ever held that the
public has a right to know expression.” Id. at 466.
I believe, however, that Judge Leval's denial of the injunctiona remedy for infringement-can be supported on grounds
that do recognize these arguments and the cited authorities.
Enjoining publication of a book is not to be done lightly. The
power to enjoin, in this as in any case, must be exercised
with a delicate consideration of all the consequences.
See Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 310-11 (discussing whether
preliminary injunction should be granted). Responsible
biographers and historians constantly use primary sources,
letters, diaries, and memoranda. Indeed, it would be
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irresponsible to ignore such sources of information. See
supra note 3. Where, as here, the very limited use of
those materials has been-I think properly-found not to affect
their marketability, the grant or denial of an injunction
remains an open question, to be determined by carefully
balancing the appropriate factors. I say that it is an open
question because the statute makes the injunction remedy
discretionary, 17 U.S.C. § 502; the cases do the same,
e.g., Rosemont; and the leading commentators concur, B.
Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 73 (1967) (“courts
have sometimes forgotten that an injunction does not go of
course; the interest in dissemination of a work may justify a
confinement of the remedy to a money recovery”); 3 Nimmer
§ 14.06[B], at 14-56.2 & n. 28 (where injunction would
work great injury, courts might grant other relief). Moreover,
other areas of property law-if one takes a purely propertyoriented view of copyright-offer a wealth of analogous cases
in which injunctive relief is a matter of discretion. See,
e.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg., 289 U.S. 334,
338, 53 S.Ct. 602, 603, 77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933) (nuisance;
equitable relief denied where injunction would cause grossly
disproportionate hardship and payment of money will afford
substantial redress); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970)
(same); Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co.,
240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325, 328 (1927) (riparian rights;
same); Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Reeves, 206 Ark. 713,
177 S.W.2d 728, 734 (1944) (trespass; same); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 951 comment a (1979) (damages may be
awarded in lieu of an injunction because of relative hardship
or a countervailing public interest).
I think that the denial of an injunction was appropriate
here for four reasons. First, the “economic incentive” for
the creation and dissemination of ideas that is provided by
the Copyright Act, Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546, 558,
105 S.Ct. at 2223, 2229, is not served by an injunction
where there is no demonstrable impairment of the quoted
materials' future market value. Yet an injunction against
Messiah would certainly prevent the biography's further
distribution in the United States-just as the Hubbard legatees
sought, unsuccessfully, to prevent publication in England,
Australia, and Canada. 7 An injunction *597 in this case
would therefore discourage writers and publishers who might
otherwise undertake critical biographies of powerful people,
without serving as an incentive for copyright holders. We

might say, then, that denying an injunction here allows us
“to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when ...
it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed
to foster.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. at
2225 n. 3 (describing fair use doctrine in general) (quoting
Iowa State, 621 F.2d at 60).
7

Appellants suggest that all that would be required would
be revision of the book so as to delete the infringing
portions and to report facts and ideas. The district court
found, however, that “the expense and waste involved in
republishing after deleting infringing material would be
prohibitive.” 695 F.Supp. at 1528. Nothing to which we
are referred in the record would make this finding clearly
erroneous.

Second, the public interest militates against granting an
injunction in this case. “Courts of equity may, and frequently
do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to
go when only private interests are involved.” Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670, 64 S.Ct. 268,
273, 88 L.Ed. 376 (1944) (quoting Virginia Ry. Co. v. System
Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S.Ct. 592, 601, 81 L.Ed.
789 (1937)). The premise of the First Amendment is that “the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public.” Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20,
65 S.Ct. 1416, 1424-25, 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945). This certainly
applies in the case of a biography of a public figure.
Biographies, of course, are fundamentally personal
histories and it is both reasonable and customary
for biographers to refer to and utilize earlier works
dealing with the subject of the work and occasionally
to quote directly from such works. This practice is
permitted because of the public benefit in encouraging the
development of historical and biographical works and their
public distribution, e.g., so “that the world may not be
deprived of improvements, or the progress of the arts be
retarded.”
Rosemont, 366 F.2d at 307 (citation omitted) (quoting Sayre
v. Moore, 1 East. 361, 102 Eng.Rep. 138, 139 (K.B.1801)).
Recognition of this point in determining whether to grant an
injunctive remedy will not swallow the fair use rule, which
after all is “equitable” in nature per Harper & Row.
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Third, a non-injunctive remedy provides the best balance
between the copyright interests and the First Amendment
interests at stake in this case. In the words of Professor
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70
Colum.L.Rev. 983, 1030 (1970):
To be actionable, invasions of
the copyright must effect economic
harm and ... an award of damages
should be preferred to the injunctive
remedy. Since copyright property has
economic value only, the principle
would permit any public participation
in the property which does not tend
to impair its value. The preference
for damages over injunctive relief
is a corollary of the requirement
of demonstrable injury. From a first
amendment viewpoint, the effect of an
injunction is to restrain the infringing
expression altogether-an effect which
goes beyond what is necessary to
secure the copyright property. An
award of monetary damages, which
permits the infringing expression at a
End of Document

reasonable cost, is more tolerable from
a first amendment point of view.
Finally, even without reference to the doctrine of unclean
hands, see supra note 5, the fact that a good argument can
be made, as the majority holds and as English and Canadian
courts held, that the delay in New Era's proceeding with
this case amounted to laches, see Goodman v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir.1979) (elements of
laches are unreasonable and inexcusable delay that prejudices
defendant), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1844,
64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980), is a factor to be weighed in the
underlying determination whether to grant injunctive relief.
Applying traditional equitable principles, then, I would hold
that Judge Leval did not abuse his discretion in declining to
issue an injunction against publication of Messiah, leaving
New Era a damages claim as to the *598 very little,
insignificant material unfairly used.

All Citations
873 F.2d 576, 57 USLW 2658, 1989 Copr.L.Dec. P 26,415,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 16 Media L. Rep. 1559
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